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Abstract 
The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) started work on 1 January 2015. Considered as 
Russia’s response to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), it has been almost ignored in 
Brussels. However, with the Ukraine crisis and the deteriorating relations with Moscow, 
some European leaders have begun to reconsider Putin’s proposal for a region-to-
region engagement. This paper tries to analyse under which conditions this could 
represent a long-term solution for a new European order. First, it is argued that the 
EEU is still far from being a credible international interlocutor. Second, Russia’s 
commitment to international trade rules and liberalization is questioned, whereas its 
geopolitical objectives seem predominant. EU engagement with the EEU in Ukraine 
would mean, in the short term, legitimizing Russia’s vision of a ‘bipolar Europe’ 
divided in spheres of influence. In the long run, prospects for inter-regional 
cooperation remain open, but the way to go is long and full of obstacles.  
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Introduction 
On 1 January 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) between the Russian 
Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia officially started work. It establishes 
the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour within a market of 170 
million people. In other words, on paper this ambitious integration project aims to 
have achieved in the last five years since the creation of the Eurasian Customs 
Union (ECU) the same objectives that have been pursued by the EU for several 
decades. The EEU is not the first attempt to reintegrate the post-Soviet space. 
However, from the creation in 2010 of the ECU with Belarus and Kazakhstan up to 
the EEU, President Putin’s ambitions have increased significantly.  
In much of the existing literature, the EEU is considered as a Russia-led 
reaction to the European Union’s policies towards the ‘shared neighbourhood’.1 In 
particular, the 2009 Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP) was perceived in Moscow as 
an attempt to undermine Russia’s influence in former Soviet countries. The de facto 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the current tensions in Eastern Ukraine 
helped confirm this hypothesis. The joint ratification of the Association Agreement 
and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) by the European 
Parliament and the Ukrainian Rada on 16 September 2014 is said to have dealt a 
blow to Putin’s aspirations to include Ukraine in the EEU. Without Ukraine, many 
argued, the whole economic as well as geopolitical significance of the Eurasian 
project is jeopardized. Nevertheless, the EEU eventually saw the light and it is likely to 
become an important regional actor in the years to come.  
Building on the existing literature, this paper aims, on the one hand, to 
present the current state of EEU developments. On the other hand, thanks also to a 
series of interviews with EU officials in early 2015, it tries to assess the response by 
Brussels to the emergence of the EEU. The 2010 proposal by Putin to establish formal 
trade relations between the EEA and the EU was initially ignored. It has recently 
gained political momentum.2 In light of these developments, this paper addresses 
the following question: what challenges and opportunities would the EU face when 
engaging with the Eurasian Economic Union? 
1 I. Dreyer and N. Popescu, “The Eurasian Customs Union: the economics and the politics”, 
EU Institute for Security Studies Brief, 21 March 2014, p. 1. 
2 A. Merkel, Speech at the German Bundestag, Berlin, 26 November 2014.  
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The paper argues that that the EEU is still far from being a credible 
international interlocutor for the EU, and Russia’s commitment to international trade 
rules remains questionable. EU engagement with the EEU in Ukraine would risk 
legitimizing Russia’s vision of a ‘bipolar Europe’. In the long run, prospects for inter-
regional cooperation remain open, but the way ahead is long and cumbersome.  
Section 2 sheds light on the history of post-Soviet Eurasian integration, as well 
as the reasons behind the establishment of the EEU. It focuses in particular on its very 
nature: is it inspired by an economic rationale, or is it a purely geopolitical project? 
Furthermore, a deeper look at the institutional framework allows for assessing the 
credibility of the EEU as an international actor: is it a paper tiger or a game-changer 
in the European and global landscape? 
Section 3 investigates the EU’s approach, characterized as ‘wait and see’. 
Only recently was EU engagement with the EEU considered by some European 
leaders, notably German Chancellor Merkel and EU High Representative 
Mogherini.3 It is important to identify, on the one hand, the main obstacles and risks 
that have so far hindered the establishment of official bloc-to-bloc relations and 
recognition of the EEU; on the other hand, the opportunities and potential added-
value the EEU could bring, notably in facilitating a political solution of the Ukraine 
crisis need to be explored.  
The conclusion assesses the EU’s ‘wait and see’ approach, highlighting the 
lack of a comprehensive strategy but also its pragmatism. As argued throughout 
the paper, there is still a long way to go before reaching a ‘fresh start’ of EU-Russia 
relations. However, it is in the EU’s interest to preserve such a new approach as a 
long-term goal. 
 
The ambiguous nature of the Eurasian Economic Union 
This section firstly compares the EEU with previous attempts of (re)integration of the 
post-Soviet space. Secondly, it tries to identify both the economic and geopolitical 
rationales behind the EEU’s inception. Thirdly, it analyses the Union’s elaborated 
institutional framework and intrinsic contradictions, which prevent the EEU from 
being a credible international actor at the current stage. 
3 “Mogherini suggests détente with Russia”, Euractiv, 15 January 2015. For the scope of this 
paper, the term ‘engagement’ means political recognition and official relations with the 
EEU. 
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This time it’s different, isn’t it? 
The breakup of the USSR was defined by Vladimir Putin as “a major geopolitical 
disaster of the century”.4 Indeed, Moscow had to redefine its role taking a step 
back “from a global to a regional power”.5 It was in these circumstances that the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) saw the light in December 1991. In this 
framework, CIS members established a network of overlapping bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, albeit with numerous exceptions and no permanent 
institutional structure. The primary functions of the CIS were the management of the 
separation of former Soviet republics and the continuation of political and 
economic dialogue in a new format. On Moscow’s agenda, however, the most 
pressing topics were domestic reform and modernization, as well as the 
establishment of positive relations with the United States and Europe.6 This partly 
explains why the CIS was allowed to remain weak and largely ineffective. 
Moreover, in economic terms the CIS regime did not seem particularly favourable 
to Russia: within its bilateral agreements, it opened its market to imports coming 
from the less competitive CIS countries and committed itself to providing them with 
raw materials and energy at discount prices. 7  The post-Soviet space was 
characterized by an intrinsic dualism: on the one hand, a dependence on Russia 
mainly due to the considerable debt accumulated by former Soviet states and their 
low international competitiveness; on the other hand, a resistance against any 
integration that could re-establish Moscow’s traditional hegemonic role. 
Consequently, Russia’s economic support to the CIS countries did not turn into 
political loyalty nor increased influence. 
Against the backdrop of such an imbalance between the costs and benefits 
of the CIS framework, in the early 2000s Russia started focusing more on Eurasian 
integration in order to ensure a fair economic and political return.8 The main goal of 
Russia’s regional policy was to consolidate its influence, notably given the 
progressive involvement of the EU in the region with the launch in 2004 of the 
4 V. Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Moscow, The 
Kremlin, 25 April 2005. 
5 T. V. Bordachev and A. S. Skriba, “Russia’s Eurasian Integration Policies”, in D. Calier (eds.), 
The Geopolitics of the Eurasian Economic Integration, London, LSE Special Report, no. 19, 
June 2014, p. 16. 
6 R. Dragneva and J. De Kort, “The Legal Regime for Free Trade in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly no. 56, 2007, p. 236. 
7 Bordachev and Skriba, op. cit., p. 17.   
8 Bordachev and Skriba, op. cit., p. 18. 
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European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In recent years, the situation has evolved 
further, notably with the latest, again Russia-driven, call for a Eurasian Union. More 
precisely, this had originally been suggested by the Kazakh President Nazarbayev in 
1994, albeit without an appropriate follow-up plan.9 Fifteen years later, the time was 
ripe for the implementation of the Eurasian idea.  
This ‘multiphase’ process started with a Customs Union between Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan in July 2010. The three members negotiated a common 
external tariff (CET, for the first time since 1991), customs norms and the setup of 
regulatory bodies.10 The second step was the Single Economic Space (SES) in 2012. 
Beyond the elimination of internal tariffs for goods, freedom of circulation was 
proclaimed also for services, capital and labour, and coordination in key policy 
areas was agreed. In Putin’s words, the European integration process served as a 
model as “[w]e see their strengths and weaknesses. And this is our obvious 
advantage since it means we are in a position to avoid mistakes and unnecessary 
bureaucratic superstructures”.11 As the paper tries to show, this statement needs to 
be nuanced. As a third step, on 29 May 2014 the leaders of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan gathered in Astana to sign the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, 
a moment that Putin defined as “epoch-making”.12 Armenia officially joined on 2 
January 2015 and Kyrgyzstan’s signature, twice postponed, arrived on 21 May 
2015.13  
The EEU was the result of intense negotiations with specific interests in each of 
the Member States’ capitals, often conflicting with Moscow’s agenda. Belarus has 
so far participated in all Russia-led attempts to foster Eurasian integration. On the 
one hand, its economy is heavily dependent on Russia, which accounts for around 
50% of its trade. On the other hand, President Lukashenko has always made his 
loyalty conditional upon Russian loans and preferential treatment, for instance 
energy supply at discount prices. The decision to join the EEU was arguably driven 
9 N. Nazarbayev, speech at the Lomonosov Moscow State University, 29 March 1994. 
10 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union - What kind of alternative to 
the Eastern Partnership?”, in A. Hug (ed.), Trouble in the Neighbourhood? The Future of the 
EU’s Eastern Partnership, London, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2015, p. 25. 
11 V. Putin, “A new integration project for Eurasia: the future in the making”, Izvestia, 3 
October 2011. 
12 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union - What kind of alternative to 
the Eastern Partnership?”, op. cit., p. 26. 
13 C. Putz, “Kyrgystan (Finally) joins the Eurasia  Economic Union”, The Diplomat, 22 May 2015. 
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by “political rent-seeking rather than strategic decision-making”.14 As to Kazakhstan, 
President Nazarbayev’s support to Eurasian integration allowed him to be 
remembered as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the EEU. Although for some experts 
political motives were predominant, on several occasions he underlined the purely 
‘economic’ nature of the project. 15  Kazakhstan’s opposition to any political 
development of the EEU was manifest during treaty negotiations. Significantly, the 
formulation “Eurasian Union” proposed by Russia was turned into “Eurasian 
Economic Union”. Moreover, the EEU Parliamentary Assembly was excluded from 
the final version.16 Some commonalities exist between the approaches of Belarus 
and Kazakhstan. On the one hand, both Lukashenko and Nazarbayev belong to 
the generation of ‘post-Soviet elites’ and display strong solidarity and closeness to 
Russia. On the other hand, they share a strong attachment to national sovereignty 
against any subjection to Russian hegemony. Given this ambivalence, it is important 
to investigate what were the main reasons for the establishment of the EEU: can an 
economic rationale with concrete benefits for participating countries be observed? 
Or are geopolitical interplays predominant? 
The rationale(s) behind the EEU 
A Customs Union, differently from a Free Trade Area (FTA), requires a CET and 
prevents members from carrying out autonomous trade policies towards third 
countries. Aiming to liberalize trade only internally, Customs Unions show rather 
‘protectionist’ intents and are often included within a wider political project.17 Their 
success depends on the balance between ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’ 
effects. Moreover, complementarity and relative wealth of the customs unions 
countries are essential for triggering economies of scale. These factors, among 
others, help in assessing the economic rationale of Eurasian integration.  
14 C. Atilgan et al., “The Eurasian Union - An Integration Project under the Microscope”, KAS 
International Reports, no. 2, 2014, p. 34. 
15 N. Nazarbayev, “Eurasian Union: From the Idea to the History of the Future”, Izvestia, 25 
October 2011. 
16  S. Secrieru, “Bumps on Russia’s road to the Eurasion Economic Union: postponed 
integration, costly enlargement and delayed international recognition”, PISM Policy Paper, 
no. 10, Issue 93, Polish Institute  of International Affairs, July 2014, p. 2. 
17 Dreyer and Popescu, op. cit., p. 2.  
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First, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) there is no evidence of trade creation directly connected with the ECU.18 On 
the contrary, intra-ECU trade overall decreased in 2013 by 5,5% and in 2014 by 
almost 12%. 19  Considerable ‘trade diversion’ effects were instead generated, 
notably at the expense of Kazakhstan which significantly increased its tariffs to align 
them to Russia’s.20 Interestingly, tariff harmonization was ruled out by Moscow in the 
case of export duties on energy resources, a key sector of its economy. As to the 
state of the economy within the ECU, compared to the EU, post-Soviet countries are 
less advanced and dispose of lower levels of technology. Second, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus do not represent a considerable perspective for market expansion for 
Russian companies. Third, their complementarity is doubtful, as raw materials and 
energy sources constitute the main export for both Russia and Kazakhstan.21 With 
the establishment of the Single Economic Space in 2012, tariff liberalization was 
accompanied by an effort to deepen integration: macro-economic policies were 
to be coordinated among members and free circulation was extended also to 
services, capital and labour. Importantly, Russia already welcomes a considerable 
number of workers from Central Asian countries: for those poor economies, this is 
one of the most attractive perspectives of the EEU. However, an internal debate on 
this topic is growing in Russia, especially in current times of deep economic crisis.22 
The Eurasian economic integration is far from complete. However, these first 
years seem to confirm De Souza’s 2011 preliminary estimation that the ECU “would 
be a GDP-reducing framework in which the negative trade-diversion effects surpass 
positive trade-creation ones”. 23  Moreover, there are considerable differences 
between the quick evolution of integration on paper and its uncertain 
implementation on the ground. 
Another relevant parameter to assess the development of the EEU is its 
degree of compliance with WTO standards. Russia joined the WTO in 2012 after 
18  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Integration across borders”, 
Transition Report 2012,  London, 2012.  
19 Eurasian Economic Commission’s website, figures published on 25 August 2014. 
20 I. Wiśniewska et al., “Eurasian Integration. Russia’s attempt at an economic unification of 
the post-soviet area”, Warsaw, OSW Studies, no. 44, July 2013, p. 12. 
21 Atilgan et al., op. cit., p. 13. 
22 Ibid. 
23  L.V. De Souza, “An initial estimation of the economic effects of the creation of the 
EurASEC Customs Union on its Members”, World Bank PREM, no. 47, January 2011, p. 1. 
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almost 20 years of negotiations, the longest accession process ever.24 In the last 
stage, it was further delayed by Moscow in order to launch the ECU. President 
Putin’s original intention was to enter the WTO with a single representation for the 
Eurasian bloc.25 Several issues still need to be solved before the EEU fully complies 
with WTO rules: among others, the selective liberalization, WTO accession of all EEU 
countries and the overall increase in the level of customs duties.  
As regards the first criterion, after the launch of the ECU the CET covered 95% 
of tariff lines. 26  However, as mentioned above, internal tariff barriers were not 
completely dismantled nor properly tackled, especially in more politically sensitive 
sectors like energy. As regards WTO membership, Kazakhstan was the latest to join 
on 27 July 2015 and now only Belarus is missing.27 The adjustment of import duty 
levels is in breach of these countries’ commitments to the other WTO members. The 
fact that Russia would be willing to bear the costs of eventual compensation 
measures suggests that Eurasian integration is seen as a long-term project with a 
political dimension.28  
Under this perspective, the EEU may be considered as the policy application 
of an overarching political and ideological conception of Europe. In 2013, Andrey 
Tsygankov distinguished three main types of foreign policy attitudes in Russia’s elites: 
in his categorization, there is conflict between “Westernizers” and “Civilizationists” 
who are respectively positive and negative towards deepening ties with Europe. 29 
Vladimir Putin’s approach would belong to a third group of leaders (the ‘Statists’) 
who struggle for recognition by Europe as an equal partner. However, 
‘Civilizationist’ rhetoric seems to gain space in recent years. In particular, Alexander 
Dugin and the anti-Western and anti-liberal ‘Eurasianist’ currently arguably play an 
important role in Putin’s politics. Erecting barriers to trade with non-EEU countries 
24 Interview with an official, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 27 April 2015. 
25 O. Shumylo-Tapiola, “The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend or Foe of the EU?”, The Carnegie 
Papers, October 2012, p. 4. 
26 R. Vilpišauskas et al., Eurasian Union: A Challenge for the European Union and Eastern 
Partnership Countries, Vilnius, EESC, 19 December 2012, p. 20. 
27 WTO website, updated on 27 July 2015. 
28 C. Matlack, “Putin’s Eurasian Union Looks Like a Bad Deal, Even for Russia”, Bloomberg 
Business, 29 May 2014. 
29 A.P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy – Change and Continuity in National Identity, 
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 3rd edn, 2013, p. 4. 
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and through powerful media campaigns, Putin is promoting his vision of a ‘bipolar 
Europe’ where the EU and the EEU are the main competitors.30 
This argument is confirmed by the fact that, since 2010, Russia has pushed for 
rapid EEU enlargement, unsustainable in the long term. In his article of 2011, Putin 
declared: “we are not going to hurry up or nudge anyone. A state must only join on 
its sovereign decision based on its long-term national interests”.31 Instead, ahead of 
the 2013 EaP Vilnius Summit, heavy political pressure convinced the Armenian 
President Serzh Sargsyan to drop the Association Agreement with the EU at the very 
last stage, joining the EEU on 2 January 2015 predominantly for security reasons 
related to the Nagorno-Karabakh region.32 A similar policy was carried out towards 
Ukraine, albeit with a different outcome. Russian pressure and the ‘trade war’ 
against Kiev in the summer of 2013 resulted in the postponement of the signature of 
the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA by the then-President Yanukovych.33 After the Maidan 
protests, Yanukovych’s overthrow in February 2014, the de facto annexation of 
Crimea and the unsettled situation in Eastern Ukraine, the newly elected President 
Poroshenko reaffirmed the ‘European choice’ of his country and signed the 
AA/DCFTA in June 2014. While the simultaneous ratification by the Ukrainian Rada 
and the European Parliament took place on 16 September 2014, Russia obtained 
the postponement of the provisional application to January 2016. More than any 
other post-Soviet country, Ukraine would have been a crucial element of the 
Eurasian project. Some authors argue that the geopolitical aspirations of the EEU 
died after its refusal to join.34  
A relevant question is whether its ambitious, politically driven roadmap of 
integration will survive the current leaders. Much will depend on the quality and 
strength of the EEU institutional system: although allegedly modeled after the EU, it 
still displays certain ‘post-Soviet characteristics’ that could undermine its success.  
 
30 N. Popescu, “Eurasian Union: the real, the imaginary and the likely”, Paris, EU Institute for 
Security Studies, Chaillot Paper, no. 132, September 2014, p. 36. 
31 Putin, “A new integration project”, op. cit. 
32 M. Shipenkov, “Armenia joins Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union”, The Moscow Times, 2 
January 2015. 
33 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges 
of Inter-Regionalism”, Leiden, Review of Central and Eastern European Law, no. 39, 2014, pp. 
213-244. 
34 Popescu, op. cit., p. 28. 
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The institutional framework: an ‘EU shell with a Soviet soul’ 
The European Union is arguably the most successful existing regional integration 
process. In a world where regions are affirming themselves as a new type of actor in 
the global arena, other organizations often consider the EU as a model for lesson-
drawing. 35  The EEU institutional architects were undoubtedly inspired by the 
European Union.36 However, the mere transfer of a template into a completely 
different context may often be problematic: indeed, the ‘supranational’ character 
of EEU institutions is considerably limited by the Member States. It is still unclear 
whether the development of such institutions “is underpinned by their functional 
relevance, or rather by other considerations such as, for instance, quests for 
international legitimacy and global prestige”.37 
The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) is composed of a Board (or 
Collegium) and a Council. The members of the Board, two per Member State, 
constitute the real ‘executive’ branch responsible for the policy areas of EEC 
competence (divided in 23 Departments), like the EU Commissioners in Brussels.38 
The Chair of the Board, Viktor Khristenko, was even presented in 2012 as the 
“Eurasian Barroso”.39 The Council, at Deputy Prime Minister level, represents instead 
a supervisory and decision-making body comparable to the Council of the EU. At 
the top of the institutional pyramid are the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, at 
Prime Ministers level, and the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (SEEC) at 
Presidential level.  
The EEU Court is composed by two judges per Member State, with a nine-
year mandate. It displays certain supranational characteristics: for example, 
economic operators may challenge EEC legal acts in Minsk, and so far many of 
them have been successful. 40  However, with the EEU Treaty Member States 
considerably limited the Court’s powers: first, bearing in mind the role played by the 
Court of Justice of the EU in the European integration process, EEU leaders 
prevented the new Court from attributing new competences to EEU bodies and 
35  T.A. Börzel and T. Risse, “Diffusing Inter-Regionalism: the EU as a Model of Regional 
Integration”, Berlin, KFG Working Paper Series, no. 7, September 2009.   
36  A. Kazharski, “The Eurasian Union: rivalling the EU through institutional isomorphism”, 
Bratislava, IESIR Working paper, no. 4, December 2012. 
37 Ibid, p. 5. 
38 Before the accession of Armenia the Board counted 9 members, 3 per Member State. 
39 A. Klimkov, Interview, Voice of Russia, 2012.  
40 Danilov, op. cit. 
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creating new legal norms. Secondly, they can jointly interpret the Treaties in a 
presumption of regularity (previously an exclusive prerogative of the Court). Thirdly, 
the power of issuing non-binding opinions on the EEU Treaty and Agreements upon 
the request of national supreme courts, similar to the EU ‘preliminary ruling’, was 
taken out of the EEU Treaty.41 
Remarkably, the EEU institutional framework grants equal voting rights to 
every Member State and some authors even argued that “Russia agreed to limit its 
own powers”.42 The standard principle within the EEU is the so-called “Belarusian 
elevator”, according to which upper level bodies may, by consensus, invalidate 
decisions taken by a lower-level body.43 At the top of the hierarchy, the SEEC has 
the last word on controversial issues, ensuring that no decision is taken without the 
agreement of one of the Presidents. The massive asymmetries in terms of both 
political and economic power in favour of Russia, however, created a situation 
where the formal consensus decision-making does not represent a serious limitation 
to the pursuit of Russian national priorities. In conclusion, it may be argued that, 
more than a proper process of “lesson-drawing” from the EU case, the EEU 
represents an example of “ceremonial mimicry” with stronger international 
legitimacy as the ultimate goal.44  
Given these factors, the ‘actorness’ of the Eurasian Economic Commission 
may be called into question. This concept was originally introduced by Sjöstedt with 
reference to the emerging European Community, as “the ability to function actively 
and deliberately in relation to other actors on the international system”.45 Jupille 
and Caporaso applied it to the EU’s “capacity to act” externally, referring to four 
main variables: authority, autonomy, cohesion and recognition.46 Bearing in mind 
the sui generis nature of the EU, these may nevertheless be applied to the EEU. 
41 E. Borovikov, I. Danilov, “B2B: Balancing the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union”, The 
Moscow Times, 17 March 2015. 
42 Atilgan et al., op. cit., p. 9. 
43 V. Shykh, former Head of the Department of Eurasian Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Belarus, speech at the seminar “Challenges of integration on the way to 
the Eurasian Economic Union”, Minsk, 10 December 2013. 
44 A. Kazharski, “Eurasian Union and Institutional Mimicry”, The Third International Congress of 
Belarusian Studies, Working Papers, vol. 3, 2014. 
45 G. Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community, Saxon House, Swedish Institute 
of International Affairs, 1977, p. 15. 
46 J. Jupille and J.A. Caporaso, ”States, agency and rules: The European Union in global 
environmental politics”, in C. Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community, 
Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 213-229. 
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The ‘autonomy’ of the EEU needs to be assessed through two indicators: 
‘institutional distinctiveness’ (the extent to which it disposes of its own structures and 
bureaucracy) and ‘independence’ from its Member States in the formulation of 
policy objectives and strategies. On the former, the approximately 1000 EEC staff 
headquartered in Moscow formally enjoy a similar status to the European 
Commission officials, hence they do not represent their respective countries. Yet, 
the predominance of Russian officials could play a role in the everyday practice. As 
regards independence, the supranational Board is overseen by the 
intergovernmental Council and the SEEC, where each member has a veto power. 
Although in a number of cases, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
unanimity is the standard practice also in the EU Council, the power Russia enjoys 
over the other EEU Member States allows for side-payments and sometimes 
coercive practices which remain rather alien to an EU system characterized by a 
higher number of checks and balances. 
‘Authority’ indicates a clear and concrete competence to act and legislate 
in certain policy areas. The EEU Treaty formally allows the EEC Board to take 
decisions in its areas of competence. However, according to the ‘Belarusian 
elevator’ system, upper-level intergovernmental bodies have the possibility to 
change or revoke it. Externally, the EEC is entitled to negotiate trade agreements 
with third countries on behalf of the whole bloc, as trade policy falls under EEU 
competence. For example, Vietnam signed an FTA with the EEU in June 2015, and 
there is growing interest from countries such as China, India, Egypt and Iran.47  
‘Cohesion’ is here interpreted as unitary external action. The de facto 
annexation of Crimea suggests that “the Eurasian regime is a pliant tool for Russian 
foreign-policy making”.48 Moscow’s ‘sanction war’ against Ukraine and the West 
showed that, when it comes to politically sensitive issues, Russia does not hesitate to 
break EEU rules and act unilaterally. Belarus and Kazakhstan, which refused to join 
this policy, tried instead to take advantage of it whenever possible. 
‘Recognition’ refers to internal and international acceptance. Although the 
EEU Treaty attributed international legal personality to the EEC, there is resistance, 
notably among Western countries, to recognize the EEU as a credible and 
47 “India confirms bid to join Russia-led bloc”, PressTV, 19 June 2015. 
48 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union - What kind of alternative to 
the Eastern Partnership?”, op. cit., p. 27. 
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legitimate interlocutor.49 The first step would be WTO membership, conditional at 
least upon the (so far complex) accession of Belarus (Kazakhstan being in the 
process of ratifying WTO membership). Notwithstanding this, Putin clearly expressed 
the wish to establish an EU-EEU “common humanitarian and economic space” from 
Lisbon to Vladivostok. 50  The proposal, formally still on the table, has not been 
seriously considered in Brussels yet.51 
This section underlined that the EEU is not Russia’s first attempt to re-integrate 
the post-Soviet space. However, given the elements of supranationalism in its 
institutional framework and the political push coming from its Member States’ 
leaders, it looks qualitatively different from past examples. Yet, a deeper analysis 
reveals how the geopolitical dimension of this project largely outweighs any 
economic logic. Moreover, the high centralization of power and other authoritarian 
tendencies show the intrinsic limits of the EEU as an international actor. 
The European Union and Eurasian integration 
This section reflects on the EEU’s current and future relations with the European 
Union. It shows that the current ‘competition’ on, notably, Ukraine is a Russia-driven 
“political artifice” rather than a natural development of regional economic 
integration models. Under this perspective, the hypothesis of a region-to-region 
engagement is assessed. 
A ‘shared neighbourhood’, two competing visions 
The creation of the ENP in the 2000s was inter alia based on the (false) conviction 
that the “EU model” would be attractive to everyone.52 However, considering the 
comparison with smaller Eastern European and South Caucasian countries as 
humiliating, Moscow refused to join the ENP.53 The current legal basis for EU-Russia 
relations is the (outdated) Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994. Since 
then the concept of ‘Strategic Partnership’ was applied and several attempts were 
49 Secrieru, op. cit., p. 5. 
50 “Putin Calls on EU to Create Common Economic Space with Russia”, RIA Novosti, 26 
November 2010. 
51 “Moscow says proposal on Eurasian Economic Union free trade deal with EU still on table”, 
TASS News Agency, 8 April 2015. 
52 Popescu, op. cit., p. 35. 
53 S. Stewart, “EU relations with Russia and the eastern neighbourhood”, in European Strategy 
Forum, Setting EU priorities 2009, Ponte de Lima, January 2009, p. 2. 
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made to deepen bilateral cooperation.54 Among others, talks on a ‘New Basic 
Agreement’ started in 2008 and in 2010 a ‘Partnership for Modernization’ was 
launched.96 Despite all these attempts, no significant results were achieved in 
bilateral talks. On the contrary, many dialogues were frozen when Russia became 
more and more assertive in its ‘near abroad’. 55  Russia’s underlying logic was 
different, as it aimed to be recognized as a regional power, on an equal footing 
with the EU. Notwithstanding this, it is important to point out that at the time of the 
creation of the ENP, Russia did not voice any concerns about the EU’s policies in 
Eastern Europe nor towards Ukraine specifically, the only opposition being 
addressed to the latter’s possible accession to NATO.56 Yet, after the launch of the 
Eurasian Customs Union, Russia increasingly started to use political, economic and 
even military means in order to persuade EaP countries to withdraw from AA/DCFTA 
negotiations with the EU and to join the Eurasian project. In this context Ukraine, far 
from being a mere victim, acted as a full-fledged player: Kiev’s ‘multivectoral 
policy’ was traditionally aimed at maximizing the benefits of cooperation both with 
the EU and Russia.57 The Ukraine-EEU rapprochement operated under Yanukovych 
was aimed, in Putin’s view, at ensuring a subsequent membership and not, as 
Ukraine wanted, to establish a balance with the EU. Mainly for this reason, even 
after the signature of the political chapters of the Association Agreement on 27 
June 2014, Moscow was not ready to accept Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ and 
denounced the potential negative effects of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA on the 
Russian economy.58  
In order to address these issues, the EU proposed to hold bilateral expert 
meetings with Russia. First of all, there seemed to be a controversy whether a 
simultaneous Ukrainian participation in the ECU and the DCFTA with the EU was 
incompatible. The establishment of the ECU was perceived in Brussels as a sudden 
and unexpected change of direction in Russia’s policy, as talks on a possible EU-
Russia FTA were ongoing since 2008.59 Moreover, in order to accommodate Russia’s 
requests and adhere to the ECU, Ukraine would have had to abandon the already 
54 For an overview, see H. Haukkala, The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership. The Limits of post-
Sovereignty in International Relations, New York, Routledge, 2010. 
55 E. Pfeifer, “The long winter ahead for EU-Russia relations”, IMR Analysis, 30 March 2015.   
56 Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement”, op. cit., p. 221. 
57 M.R. Freire, “Ukraine´s multivectorial foreign policy: looking West while not overlooking its 
Eastern neighbour”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 20, May 2009. 
58 Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement”, op. cit., p. 231. 
59 Interview with a European Commission official, DG Trade, Brussels, 27 April 2015. 
16 
                                                 
BRIGG Paper 1/2015 
advanced AA/DCFTA negotiations with the EU. This pressure resulted from the very 
nature of Russia’s proposed customs union, while it would not have been necessary 
if Ukraine had been offered to join a free trade area.  
With regard to the assessment of gains and losses, EU officials underlined the 
positive effect of increased competition in the Ukrainian market.60 The DCFTA with 
the EU would gradually establish a level-playing field, with EU and Russian products 
competing on equal terms: while for the Russian side this would constitute a loss, 
according to the EU it would be beneficial for Russian-owned companies operating 
in Ukraine, which would gain preferential access to the wider EU market. Moreover, 
one could even question the very presence of damage for Russia due to the EU-
Ukraine DCFTA: Ukraine represents 5% of Moscow’s exports, predominantly energy 
sources and nuclear equipment that the DCFTA left largely untouched.61 
In July 2014 bilateral EU-Russia consultations became trilateral, involving also 
Ukraine. Interestingly, Russia seemed to consider itself as having “the guardianship 
of Ukraine’s sovereign choice” regarding which integration to pursue. 62  After 
months of intense negotiations, and Russia’s threats to escalate military tensions and 
trade sanctions towards Ukraine, the provisional application of the DCFTA was 
postponed to 1 January 2016.63  
While DG Trade officials engaged in expert meetings with Russian 
counterparts and efficiently unveiled trade-related myths, European political 
leaders were lacking a strategic approach: in fact, both with regard to the Ukraine 
crisis and the emerging Eurasian Economic Union, the EU showed a ‘reactive’ rather 
than ‘proactive’ approach that needs to be further analyzed. 
‘Wait and see’: Brussels’ short-term syndrome? 
The evolution of Eurasian integration and its potential consequences for the EU have 
not been the subject of a comprehensive strategic debate within the EU institutions, 
and even less among Member States. 64  Both at Foreign Affairs Council and 
60 Ibid. 
61  I. Dreyer and N. Popescu, “Trading with Moscow: the law, the  politics and the 
economics”, EUISS Brief Issue Papers, no. 31, November 2014, p. 2. 
62 Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement”, op. cit., p. 237. 
63 R. Sadowski and A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, “Russia is blocking a free trade area between 
the EU and Ukraine”, OSW analyses, 17 September 2014. 
64 Interview with an official, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Unit ‘Trade’, 
Brussels, 13 April 2015. 
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European Council level, the attention has mainly focused on the management of 
the Ukraine crisis, with the ‘Minsk process’ aiming to reach a ceasefire in the East of 
the country and on the restrictive measures against Russia.65 With the de facto 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the security dimension became predominant 
and policy formulation more reactive and short-term oriented. The non-recognition 
of this annexation has always been a firm point of the EU’s position. Moreover, the 
second EU-Russia Summit in 2014 was cancelled upon decision of the European 
Council.66 
The EU’s position was built under the prism of the Ukraine crisis, without a 
longer-term vision. One of the few EU official documents mentioning the EEU reads: 
While the EU in general supports regional economic integration, it believes 
that any such integration, including the Eurasian Economic Union, must be 
fully based on WTO principles and rules, must respect the sovereign and 
autonomous decisions of States to decide on their participation, and should 
not create obstacles to trade between its members and the EU.67  
In March 2015, European leaders reaffirmed that: 
the duration of the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, 
adopted on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, should be 
clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements, 
bearing in mind that this is only foreseen by 31 December 2015. The necessary 
decisions will be taken in the coming months. The European Council stands 
ready to take further measures if necessary.68  
Despite the common position reached, EU Member States have displayed different 
attitudes towards the Russian Federation. For some Central and Eastern European 
countries the security dimension remained a priority, given their geographical 
proximity and historical ties with Russia. Conversely, other European leaders such as 
Chancellor Merkel were not fully supportive of a long-lasting sanctions regime. 
Germany is in fact the first destination of Russian petroleum and gas in Europe, and 
more than 6000 German companies have invested in Russia a total amount of 
around € 20 billion in recent years.69 Mainly because of EU sanctions and related 
Russian retaliation measures, bilateral trade dropped by 8% in 2014.70 Overall, the EU 
has been united in condemning the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine 
65 A thorough analysis of the Minsk Agreements would fall outside the scope of this work. 
66 European Council, Conclusions, Brussels, 20-21 March 2014, p. 13. 
67 Council of the EU, Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy, 
SWD(2015) 2 final, 13 January 2015. 
68 European Council, Conclusions, Brussels, 19-20 March 2015, p. 4. 
69 “Economic War with Russia: A High Price for German Business”, Der Spiegel, 17 March 
2014. 
70 “Russia-EU trade down by 8% as result of cooperation rollback — Russian ForMin”, TASS 
News Agency, 22 April 2015.   
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and Russia’s attempts to destabilize the country. However, the ‘sanctions war’ has 
been detrimental for the European economies and for some countries in 
particular.71  
There is no doubt that the recent assertiveness of Russia in the ‘shared 
neighbourhood’, and notably in Ukraine, required a firm response by the European 
Union. In March 2014, a set of targeted restrictive measures on Russian elites were 
agreed, and since then both the sector coverage and intensity have been 
increased.72 However, while being an appropriate response in the short term, these 
restrictive measures do not seem to be accompanied by a comprehensive long-
term strategy. The EU’s objectives are still unclear, since Russia has not shown any 
willingness to change its policies, despite suffering from a deep economic crisis. It 
was argued that ‘too effective sanctions’ could even be counterproductive for the 
EU. Restrictive measures imposed by the West have been used in the domestic 
arena as an argument to cover the failure of President Putin’s economic policies. In 
fact, Leonard and Krastev noted that even without Western sanctions the Russian 
economy would be stagnating. 73  Moreover, if the objective of sanctions was 
Russia’s isolation, the effect could instead be a reorientation of its trade towards 
other partners such as China.74 As Leonard and Krastev put it,  
Russia’s isolation or self-isolation is not in the EU’s interest. It could sharpen 
some of the differences between the member states. It would reduce the 
EU’s competitiveness in the global market. And it would also doom Ukraine to 
permanent instability.75 
At the time of writing, Russia has not shown any signs of surrender. Apart from the 
economic and financial arguments, the reasons could be identified in Russia’s vision 
of itself and the European order. Putting pressure on neighbouring countries 
constitutes an intrinsic element of the ‘Eurasianist’ approach adopted by Putin to 
affirm his country as a regional power on equal footing with the EU. 76 Among 
European leaders, this awareness has gradually gained ground.  
71 A. Gurkov, “EU and Russia on the brink of ‘sanctions war’”, Deutsche Welle, 14 March 2014.  
72 For a comprehensive analysis, see T. Dolidze, “EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: The 
Sanctioner-Sanctionee’s Game of Thrones”, CEPS Working Document, no. 402, Brussels, 
January 2015. 
73 M. Leonard and I. Krastev, “The New European Disorder”, ECFR Analysis, November 2014. 
74 S. Merler, “Russian roulette, reloaded”, Bruegel, 30 September 2014. 
75 Leonard and Krastev, op. cit.,  p. 7. 
76 K. Liik, “The real problem with Mogherini’s Russia paper”, ECFR Commentary, 20 January 
2015. 
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For the first time in 2010, while the ECU was taking shape, Putin spoke about a 
possible FTA “from Lisbon to Vladivostok” with the EU.77 According to him,  
[a] partnership between the Eurasian Union and EU that is economically 
consistent and balanced will prompt changes in the geo-political and geo-
economic setup of the continent as a whole with a guaranteed global 
effect.78  
The Russian President reiterated this message during the January 2014 EU-Russia 
Summit, receiving full support by Nazarbayev.79 On the ‘Eurasian side’, studies have 
already started on the potential of deeper EU-EEU economic integration, with a 
view to concluding an ambitious and comprehensive agreement by the 2020s.80 
Despite a ‘wait and see’ approach adopted by the EU, a debate on possible 
engagement with the EEU gradually gained momentum and in January 2015 High 
Representative Mogherini suggested launching an internal feasibility study. The 
perspective of recognition and FTA negotiations was considered as a possible 
‘carrot’ to be used as leverage in more complex consultations involving the 
situation in Ukraine.81 Following the same reasoning, Commissioner for Enlargement 
and Neighbourhood Policy Hahn stressed that the DCFTA with Ukraine does not 
prevent Kiev from deepening its trade relations with Moscow, and welcomed the 
establishment of trilateral talks to lower current tensions.82  
The EU’s openness to dialogue did not neglect the traditional, fundamental 
pre-condition: the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements by Russia. 
Notwithstanding this, it is undeniable that a change of approach has occurred and 
the perspective of recognizing the EEU is now considered in Brussels. This has also 
become the subject of debate among scholars, arguing both in favour of and 
against EU region-to-region interaction. If sanctions are proving to be costly for 
Europe and inefficient towards Russia, to what extent would engagement with the 
EEU be an appropriate answer? 
77 “Putin Calls on EU to Create Common Economic Space with Russia,”, op. cit.  
78 Putin, “A new integration project”, op. cit. 
79 R. Weitz, “President Nazarbayev Discusses Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, vol. 11, no. 30, 14 February 2014.  
80 E. Vinokurov and I. Tochickaya, Quantifying EU-EEU Economic Integration: Methodological 
Approaches, Eurasian Development Bank & IPM Institute, Vienna, 6-7 March 2014. 
81 EEAS, Issues Paper on Relations with Russia, presented at the Foreign Affairs Council of 19 
January 2015. 
82 “EU pushing Ukraine towards trilateral free trade, with Russia”, EurActiv, 15 April 2015. 
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Engaging with the EEU: opportunities and challenges 
Besides the recent declarations of certain European leaders, the main advocate of 
EU-EEU trade talks remains the Russian Federation. First of all, from an institutional 
perspective, it is seen as a natural consequence of the transfer of competences 
from the national to the Eurasian level: 
In the end, it will have to be explained to our European friends that, since 
economic regulations are already now largely dealt with at the union level 
with the Eurasian Economic Commission in charge, individual EEU member 
states have nothing to talk about with Europe.83 
The emergence of the EEU, some argued, would put an end to the Brussels-made 
‘unipolar’ vision of Europe, acknowledging instead the coexistence of two regional 
models. 
For the experts of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) an EU-EEU “mega-
deal” would make sense also from an economic point of view. 84 To back this 
argument, reference was made not only to the territorial proximity, but also to 
energy interdependency. 85 The ‘mega-deal’ would also be justified by the 
considerable trade flows between the EU and (especially) Russia and Kazakhstan, 
the EU being their largest trade partner. Adding to that, the EU would largely benefit 
from the opening of the EEU’s market, as the production of commodities is low and 
could be compensated by EU exports. 86  Moreover, there is awareness on the 
Eurasian side that the EU could offer a precious help for the modernization of the 
economy, thus explaining the interest towards the flow of capital and the transfer of 
technology. On the EU’s side, one may argue, there should be an interest to provide 
technical assistance and to foster capacity building, especially in the newly-
created EEU institutions.  
All of these arguments, however, fail to consider the significant divergence 
between the theory and the practice of the EEU.87 While it apparently displays a 
multilateral structure, in reality it “conceals a network of bilateral relations centered 
83 T. Bordachev, “Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union: the view from Moscow”, ECFR 
Commentary, 21 January 2015. 
84 E. Vinokurov, “Mega Deal Between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic 
Union”, Russia in Global Politics, November-December 2014. 
85 E. Vinokurov, “EU-Russia Economic Relations: Looking Ten Years Ahead”, World Finance 
Review, May 2014, p. 12. 
86 Interview with an official, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 27 April 2015. 
87 Ibid. 
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on Russia”.88 The EEU’s institutional structure is widely perceived as an empty shell in 
Brussels as well.89 More specifically, given the high degree of asymmetry in the 
internal EEU balance of powers, some experts argued that engaging with the EEU 
would allow Russia to strengthen its negotiating position and force the other EEU 
members to align to it. 90  Hence, those who hope that, acting within the EEU 
framework, Russia would show more flexibility and openness would miss the point. 
The current ‘sanctions war’ with the EU clearly shows that the EEU institutions are not 
able to limit Russia’s power to act unilaterally on particularly sensitive political 
issues.91 Moscow’s tendency to break the rules agreed at the Eurasian level makes it 
difficult for the EU to commit officially.  
From the economic point of view, there is little trust that this ‘mega-deal’ 
would bring significant liberalization as the very establishment of the ECU suggested 
that Russia has no intention to further open its economy. The rather negative record 
of Russia in the WTO dispute settlement system constitutes a major source of worry 
for the EU: for example, Russia’s ban on imports of live pigs, pork and other pig 
products from the EU reduced total EU exports by almost 25%, allegedly because of 
phytosanitary issues related to individual cases of African Swine Fever (ASF).92 For 
this and other reasons, currently EU officials are investigating possible ways of 
continuing trade talks with individual EEU members like Armenia and Kazakhstan, 
taking advantage of the numerous exceptions and grey areas left by the EEU 
framework. 93  Finally, the deep economic crisis affecting the Russian economy, 
together with the lack of reforms and modernization, casts doubt on the endurance 
of the Eurasian project itself.94 
As regards the impact that a bloc-to-bloc approach could have on the 
Ukraine crisis, experts’ views diverge: while for some it would be part of the solution, 
for others it would divert the focus from the real, political problem: the violation of 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. According to Vinokurov, “[t]he issue of Ukrainian 
88 A. Eberhard, “Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine - an opportunity or a trap?”, 
Warsaw, OSW Commentary, no. 154, December 2014, p. 1. 
89 Interview with an adviser of the President of the European Parliament, Bruges, 22 January 
2015. 
90 Eberhard, op. cit., p. 3.  
91  According to Russian diplomats, the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council issued a 
‘decree’ allowing individual Member States to act unilaterally in specific circumstances. 
92 European Commission, DG SANCO’s website, Ongoing WTO dispute settlement cases 
against Russia.   
93 Interview with an official, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 27 April 2015. 
94 Interview with an adviser of the President of the European Parliament, op. cit. 
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sustainable development can ultimately be resolved only in the triangle EU-Ukraine-
Russia”, notably for the financial burden it would imply.95 Leonard and Krastev even 
write that “[t]he failure to recognize the opportunity born out of Putin’s project for 
the EEU is at the core of the current crisis”. In their view, engaging with the EEU 
would be a way for the EU to move the competition from the military to the 
economic field.96 However, considering EU-EEU engagement as part of the solution 
to the Ukraine crisis would be misleading for several reasons. The bilateral (then 
trilateral) trade consultations on the effects of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA on the Russian 
economy demonstrated that Moscow follows a geopolitical more than an 
economic logic. That same logic was at the basis of the creation of the EEU: 
therefore, a change of setting is not likely to translate into a different behaviour by 
Russia. Building on that, Eberhard argues that the main problem is of a political and 
security nature, while trade would represent nothing more than a tool to achieve 
broader foreign policy goals.97 It would therefore be naïve to imagine that EU-EEU 
trade talks could serve the EU’s interests and particularly the implementation of the 
Minsk Agreements. Such a concession by the EU would probably not contribute to 
the stabilization of Ukraine, as it is in Russia’s interest to transform the latter into a 
“permanently unstable and inefficient state”.98  
Another aspect, apparently overlooked, is the position of Ukraine within this 
framework. As stressed by the Council of the EU, participation in the EEU shall 
“respect the sovereign and autonomous decisions of States”.99 EU engagement 
with the EEU on the future economic relations with Ukraine would turn Kiev into a 
“mere subject of discussion”.100 Not only would this deny its ‘European choice’; it 
would also represent an appraisal of Russia’s policies with respect to, among others, 
Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and Armenia. From a more geopolitical perspective, the EU 
would formally value Russia’s vision of a ‘bipolar Europe’, divided in spheres of 
influence as it used to be during the Cold War. 
95 Vinokurov, “EU-Russia Economic Relations”, op. cit., p. 12. 
96 Leonard and Krastev, op. cit., p. 6. 
97 Eberhard, op. cit., p. 3. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Council of the EU, Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy, 
op. cit. 
100 Eberhard, op. cit., p. 3. 
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Conclusions: Still a long way to go  
This paper investigated the challenges and opportunities for the EU in case of 
engagement with the newly-established Eurasian Economic Union. It argues that a 
strong engagement would be premature at this stage, but it should be kept as a 
long-term goal.  
To explain the reasons behind this assessment, the latest wave of Eurasian 
integration was analysed from an economic, geopolitical and institutional 
perspective. Even though it is not yet possible to assess the economic effects of 
integration, the initial trends showed the absence of a significant economic 
rationale, with benefits unequally distributed among members. The geopolitical 
logic seems predominant instead. All in all, the EEU is still more of a paper tiger than 
a game-changer, representing mainly an attempt by Russia to increase 
international recognition and legitimacy as a regional power.101  
These arguments play an important role in assessing the Russian proposal to 
establish bloc-to-bloc relations aiming at a free trade area “from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok”. The paper argued that EU-EEU engagement would not help settle the 
Ukraine crisis. On the contrary, the EU would give credit to Russia’s vision of a 
‘bipolar Europe’, legitimizing its claims over Ukraine. The sovereign choice of Kiev 
would be neglected, turning it into a “mere subject of discussion”.102 Furthermore, 
the EU could be criticized for allowing Russia to interfere in its bilateral relations with 
Ukraine which could represent a dangerous precedent and result in increasing 
demands by Moscow rather than appeasement.103 In conclusion, the current EU 
restrictive measures seem appropriate in the short term, as they aim to increase the 
cost for the continuation of Russia’s policies. In Torreblanca’s words,  
[b]efore validating Moscow’s Eurasian project, the EU must respect and 
protect the European choice of the Ukrainians. Once Putin also understands 
and protects this choice, the EU can be opened to the Eurasian Union. As in 
the past, strategic patience will pay off.104 
For the medium to long term, the EU still lacks a comprehensive strategy on how to 
deal with its main Eastern neighbour. The recent tensions with Russia over the 
101 A. Kazharki, “Is Putin Winning the Recognition Game? Is the Eurasian Union Back on the 
Table?”, PONARS Eurasia Commentary, 12 February 2015. 
102 Eberhard, op. cit., p. 3. 
103 Dreyer and Popescu, “Trading with Moscow”, op. cit., p. 1. 
104 J.I. Torreblanca, ”Strategic patience with Russia will pay off”, ECFR Commentary, 10 
December 2014. 
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‘shared neighbourhood’ were a wake-up call for the EU and a signal that 
something should change in its European Neighbourhood Policy. The current 
revision should take into account the emergence of the EEU and its eventual 
inclusion in the shaping of the new European order − developments that the 
‘unipolar’ Eastern Partnership initiative did not take into account. The development 
of the EEU as a ‘rule-based system’ should not be taken for granted, and even if it 
does materialize, will probably take several years. In the meantime, however, 
European leaders should start a serious debate on their strategic interests with 
regard to the EEU, as it is already impacting the EU in different ways.105 In doing so, 
once the technical and political conditions allow it, the EU will have a clear and 
constructive mandate to bring to the negotiating table.  
 
105 Dreyer and Popescu, “Trading with Moscow”, op. cit., p. 4. 
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